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TCS-508/68
Copy No. 7

25 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Guidelines for the CIA Imagery Exploitation
Requirements and Reporting Process

1. This memorandum recommends for your approval a rationale and a set of guidelines for application to the CIA imagery exploitation requirements and reporting process in light of the National Tasking Plan (NTP) and the COMIREX basic support exploitation program. These guidelines have the concurrence of the CIA Member of COMIREX, the CIA Member of the COMIREX/EXSUBCOM, the Director of IAS and the Executive Director of NPIC.

2. In developing the guidelines, I have taken into consideration the views which have emerged in previous draft papers by different people, as well as the philosophies which were surfaced during our recent general meeting on this topic. I believe these guidelines are consistent with the intent of the JIIRG Report, with provisions of the National Tasking Plan, and with the effort to maintain and improve the resource capabilities of the Imagery Analysis Service for support of Agency production components. Any set of guidelines must be flexible so that potentially troublesome requirements and reporting questions can be considered on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, I have tried to avoid absolute rigidity without sacrifice of the value of clear definition. At the end of a year it may be desirable to review the guidelines for possible revisions in light of experience gained with operation of the NTP and those changes reflected by the content of future basic support programs.

3. The FY-69 COMIREX basic support exploitation and reporting program is to be implemented about 18 July 1968. CIA is participating via the COMIREX/EXSUBCOM and is contributing those exploitation requirements which can be identified in advance for inclusion in the FY-69 program. This program will define the nature, scope and timing of the work to be done under the NTP by the various imagery interpretation organizations. As of this time, all targets (objects, installations, areas and activities) in each substantive category are being reviewed to select those of community interest for inclusion in the program. Following EXSUBCOM coordination and COMIREX approval, the elements of this program will be assigned to each of the responsible exploitation organizations and presumably will be accepted to the extent that these organizations believe that they can complete the work as scheduled. If an assigned element of the program exceeds the capability of the organization having NTP primary

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responsibility and the organization cannot complete the proposed task during the next fiscal year, EXSUBCOM will either modify the task or request another organization to do the work. Therefore, some Agency information needs will be satisfied by the programmed work of imagery interpretation organizations having primary responsibility for community basic support under the NTP.

4. The Central Intelligence Agency, however, has a unique intelligence role in the community. It must support the Director of Central Intelligence, developing its own positions and contributions over a broad range of critical intelligence problems; many of these are also of prime production concern to another USIB-member agency. In this intelligence role, Agency production components receive direct support from the Imagery Analysis Service whose capabilities must therefore cover a broad range of substantive matters, as evidenced by the IAS "black dot" assignments in the NTP. In addition, IAS has primary community responsibility under the NTP for COMIREX-programmed basic support in the field of non-military economics and logistics. Therefore, IAS must have a cadre of well-trained and highly-motivated imagery analysts with a continuing capability to respond on a broad range of intelligence subjects.

5. IAS direct support exploitation activities include those concerned with support of Clandestine Services operations; support of production office special projects and studies; preliminary assessments of the results of recent reconnaissance missions; independent assessments of imagery-derived information on critical intelligence problems; and development and testing of hypotheses and of new exploitation approaches. Some of these tasks necessarily focus IAS effort on installations, objects, areas and activities of community interest for which other exploitation organizations have primary basic support responsibility under the NTP. This factor raises the question of how best to avoid unnecessary duplication of the community third-phase effort while ensuring that CIA's needs are met as effectively as possible.

6. A concept for guiding assignment of CIA third-phase exploitation requirements and for reporting significant findings to the community must be based on more than rigid adherence to the NTP "black box" structure. As I see it, the phrase "primary responsibility" as used in the NTP was not intended to mean sole responsibility. In discharging its NTP-assigned direct support responsibility to the Agency, IAS can contribute also to the COMIREX basic support exploitation program and to other community needs but, of course, should not compete needlessly with work scheduled by another organization.

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The general objectives should be to avoid unnecessary duplication, to avoid unnecessary interruption of the basic support exploitation program, and to share any significant results of CIA-sponsored direct support exploitation.

7. Based on this rationale, I propose the following as general guidelines for assignment of CIA-originated third-phase exploitation requirements:

a. Some exploitation requirements can be scheduled in advance on the basis of anticipated need and community interest. Such CIA requirements will be incorporated in the COMIREX basic support exploitation program and assigned by COMIREX to the exploitation organization having NTP primary responsibility. Both IRS and IAS will use the basic support exploitation program for the current fiscal year as a means of avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort by IAS. There will be instances when CIA needs as to timing* of the scheduled basic support exploitation are such that it will be advantageous to have IAS undertake the work. Under these circumstances, the CIA Member of EXSUBCOM will ensure coordination of the proposed IAS undertaking with the EXSUBCOM and with the organization scheduled to do the work. The IAS findings may be reported to the CIA requester and to the National Data Base by means of a typescript memorandum. Generally, however, if the IAS findings fully satisfy the scheduled basic support requirement, IAS will publish a report with the acknowledged coordination of the organization originally scheduled to produce the report. In this instance the COMIREX-approved basic report format will be used.

b. Additional CIA requirements for third-phase exploitation will be categorized as direct support requirements and for the most part will be assigned to IAS. There will be exceptions, of course. For example, when a CIA production component expresses a valid need for NPIC to respond to a direct support requirement, the requirement may be so assigned by the Information Requirements Staff after consultation with IAS. For the most part, IAS responses

* CIA needs which differ in nature and scope from the scheduled basic support exploitation will be treated as direct support requirements.

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to CIA direct support requirements will be in the form of typescript memoranda from IAS to the requesting CIA component. If such a memorandum contains significant findings which would be of value to other agencies, IAS may transmit a copy to the National Data Base. If IAS and the requesting office or division agree that the nature of the direct support effort merits dissemination of significant findings to the community in the format of a published report, IAS may produce such a report noting clearly that it was prepared by IAS in direct support of the Central Intelligence Agency. The COMIREX-approved basic report format will be used for such reports when feasible and appropriate.

8. Each Agency requirement will be considered in light of the foregoing guidelines together with all other factors bearing on that particular case and will be assigned to the most appropriate organization with the principal objective of ensuring the best response to the production component of the Agency which needs the information. The Information Requirements Staff will serve as the focal point for processing all Agency-originated exploitation requirements (except for those of the Clandestine Services). Validation of requirements is the responsibility of the originating production component and IRS will ensure such validation at the appropriate level within the production components. In addition, IRS will monitor the overall effectiveness of the Agency imagery exploitation requirements and reports process and will provide staff support to the Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence by reporting progress and problems together with any recommendations concerning needed changes or unresolved problems.

9. I recommend that you approve the rationale and guidelines outlined above as a basis for common action among Agency components involved in the imagery exploitation requirements and reporting process.

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Acting Chief

DDI/Information Requirements Staff

APPROVED:

EDWARD W. PROCTOR

Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence

25 June 1968
(Date)

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
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Requirements and Reporting Process

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Remarks:

The attached is an attempt to clarify the guidelines for levying requirements on IAS. I believe this approach will take care of the potential difficulties we might get into when arrangements for the National Tasking Plan are implemented next month. I urge that the production offices in your Directorate conform to these guidelines in placing requirements for third-phase exploitation. Attached are copies for OSI and FMSAC

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